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Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces∗
Jason Hartline† Aleck Johnsen† Denis Nekipelov‡ Onno Zoeter§
Abstract
This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online mar-
ketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We
assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the true values of the agents and we
develop online winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms that implement the same outcome of the
algorithm with the aid of a bidding dashboard. The bidding dashboards that we develop work
in conjunction with the mechanism to guarantee that bidding according to the dashboard is
strategically equivalent (with vanishing utility difference) to bidding truthfully in the sequential
truthful implementation of the allocation algorithm. Our dashboard mechanism makes only a
single call to the allocation algorithm in each stage.
1 Introduction
This paper formalizes a theoretical study of bidding dashboards for the design of online markets.
In these markets short-lived users arrive frequently and are matched with long-lived agents. Rarely
in practice do market mechanisms, which allow the agents to bid to optimize their matching with
the users, have truthtelling as an equilibrium strategy.1 The non-truthfulness of mechanisms for
these markets is frequently the result of practical constraints; this paper is part of a small but
growing literature on the design of these non-truthful mechanisms. By formally modeling bidding
dashboards, which are common in these markets, this paper gives simple and practical approach
to non-truthful mechanism design.
Two key challenges for the design of non-truthful mechanisms are (i) assisting the agents to find
good strategies in these mechanisms and (ii) identifying mechanisms that have good outcomes when
agents find good strategies. Bidding dashboards, which provide agents with market information
relevant for bid optimization and are common in online marketplaces,2 can provide a solution to
∗A two-page abstract appeared in the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
†Northwestern U., Evanston IL. Work done in part while authors were visiting Booking.com and in part while
supported by NSF CCF 1618502. Email: hartline@northwestern.edu, aleckjohnsen2012@u.northwestern.edu
‡U. of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA. Work done in part while author was visiting Booking.com and in part while
supported by NSF CCF 1563708. Email: denis@virginia.edu
§Booking.com, Amsterdam, Netherlands. Email: onno.zoeter@booking.com
1Such a matching is often the combination of a ranking of the agents by the market mechanism and the users’
choice behavior. Examples of the agents in such mechanisms include, sellers posting a buy-it-now price on eBay,
hoteliers choosing a commission percentage on Booking.com, or advertisers bidding in Google’s ad auction. The
first-two-examples are “winner pays bid” for the agents; none of these examples have truthtelling as an equilibrium.
Though the Google Ad auction is not winner-pays-bid, its bidding dashboard displays clicks versus cost-per-click
which is equivalent to a winner-pays-bid mechanism.
2For example, Google provides a dashboard that forecasts click volume and cost per click as a function of adver-
tisers’ bids and Booking.com provides a visibility booster that forecasts percentage of increased clicks relative to base
commission as a function of the commission percentage offered by the hotel for bookings.
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both issues. This paper gives a formal study of dashboard mechanisms and identifies dashboards
and the accompanying mechanism that lead agents to find good strategies and in which good
strategies result in good outcomes.
A novel technical feature of the mechanisms proposed by this paper is the use of econometric
inference to infer the preferences of the agents in a way that permits the mechanism to then allocate
nearly optimally for the inferred preferences. To illustrate this idea, consider the Nash equilibrium
of the winner-pays-bid mechanism that allocates a single item to one of two agents with probability
proportional to their bids, i.e., an agent wins with probability equal to her bid divided by the sum
of bids, cf. the proportional share mechanism (e.g., Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2004). Fixing the bid of
agent 2, and assuming agent 1’s bid is in best response, the standard characterization of equilibria
in auctions allows the inversion of agent 1’s bid-optimization problem and identification of agent
1’s value.3 The same holds for agent 2. Thus, in hindsight the principal knows both agents’ values.
The difficulty, which this paper addresses, of using this idea in a mechanism is the potential circular
reasoning that results from attempting to allocate efficiently given these inferred values.
The paper considers general environments for single-dimensional agents, i.e., with preferences
given by a value for service and utility given by value times service probability minus payment.
The main goal of the paper is to convert an allocation algorithm, which maps the values of the
agents to the set of agents that are served, into a mechanism that implements the same outcome
but has a winner-pays-bid or all-pay payment format. In winner-pays-bid mechanisms the agents
report bids, the mechanism selects a set of agents to win, and all winners pay their bids. In all-pay
mechanisms the agents report bids, the mechanism selects a set of agents to win, and all agents
pay their bids. For practical reasons, many markets are winner-pays-bid or all-pay.4
From a theoretical point of view, the focus on winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms is
interesting because the prior literature has not identified good winner-pays-bid mechanisms for
general environments (with the exception of Hartline and Taggart, 2016, to be discussed with
related work). For example, the natural highest-bids-win winner-pays-bid mechanism for the
canonical environment of single-minded combinatorial auctions does not exhibit equilibria that are
close to optimal (even for special cases where winner determination is computationally tractable;
see Lucier and Borodin, 2010, and Du¨tting and Kesselheim, 2015).
The motivating marketplaces for this work are ones were short-lived users perform a search or
collection of searches in order to identify one or more long-lived agents with whom to transact.
The principal facilitates the user search by, for example, ranking the agents by a combination of
perceived match quality for the user and the agents’ willingness to pay for the match, henceforth, the
agents’ valuations. Strategically, the agents are in competition with each other for matching with
the user. Viewing the user as a random draw from a population of users with varying tastes results
in a stochastic allocation algorithm which maps the valuation profile of agents to the probabilities
that a user selects each agent. This stochastic allocation algorithm is typically monotone in each
agent’s value and continuous (e.g., Athey and Nekipelov, 2010).
A dashboard gives the agent information about market conditions that enables bid optimiza-
tion. Without loss in our setting, the dashboard is the agent’s predicted bid allocation rule. Our
dashboard mechanism assumes that the bids are best response to the published dashboard, i.e.,
3The bid-allocation rule of agent 1 is x˜1(b) = b/(b+b2). Agent 1 with value v1 chooses b1 = argmaxb(v1−b) x˜1(b);
this bid satisfies v1 = b1+ x˜1(b1)/x˜
′
1(b1) = 2b1+b
2
1/b2. For example, if b1 = 1 and b2 = 2, we can infer that agent 1’s
value is v1 = 5/2.
4All-pay mechanisms correspond to markets were agents pay monthly for service and the service level depends on
the total payment which is fixed in advance by the agent’s bid.
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they “follow the dashboard”, and uses econometric inference to invert the profile of bids to get a
profile of values. The dashboard mechanism for a given dashboard and allocation algorithm is as
follows:
0. Publish the dashboard bid allocation rule to each agent and solicit each agent’s bid.
1. Invert the bid of each agent, assuming it is in best response to the published dashboard, to
obtain an inferred value for each agent.
2. Execute the allocation algorithm on the inferred values to determine the outcome; charge
each winner her bid (winner-pays-bid) or all agents their bids (all-pay).
Our main result is to identify dashboards where following the dashboard is not an assumption
but near optimal strategy for the agents. For online marketplaces, we define winner-pays-bid
and all-pay dashboards for any sequence of allocation algorithms where following the dashboard
for a sequence of values is approximately strategically equivalent to bidding those values in the
sequential truthful mechanism corresponding to the sequence of allocation algorithms. Thus, there
is an approximate correspondence between all equilibria. The notion of approximate strategic
equivalence is that the allocations are identical and the differences in payments vanish with the
number of stages.
Our dashboards can be implemented in the (blackbox) single-call model for mechanism design.
In this model, an algorithm has been developed that is monotonic in each agent’s value and obtains
a good outcome. The mechanism’s only access to the allocation algorithm is by live execution, i.e.,
where the outcome of the algorithm is implemented. Babaioff et al. (2010) introduced this model
and showed that truthful mechanisms can be single-call implemented. We show that winner-pays-
bid and all-pay dashboard mechanisms can be single-call implemented in online marketplaces.
The above approach to the design of online markets is simple and practical. Though we have
specified the mechanism and framework for winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms and single-
dimensional agents, the approach naturally generalizes to multi-dimensional environments and other
kinds of mechanisms. It requires only that, from bids that are optimized for the dashboard, the
preferences of the agents can be inferred. Moreover, payment formats can be mixed-and-matched
across different agents within the same mechanism.
Related Work. This paper is on non-revelation mechanism design as it applies to online markets.
The goals of this paper – in providing foundations for non-revelation mechanism design – are closest
to those of Hartline and Taggart (2016, 2019). Both papers study iterated environments and the
design of mechanisms with welfare that is arbitrarily close to the optimal welfare under general
constraints. (Hartline and Taggart additionally consider the objective of maximizing revenue.)
The equilibrium concept of Hartline and Taggart is Bayes-Nash equilibrium and it is assumed that
agents are short-lived. These assumptions are not appropriate for the design of online markets
considered in this paper, where agents are long-lived and possibly have persistent values.
There have been extensive studies of the price of anarchy of ad auctions, e.g., on the Google
search engine (Leme and Tardos, 2010; Caragiannis et al., 2011; Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013). A
conclusion of these studies is that in standard models of equilibrium the industry-standard general-
ized second price auction can have welfare that is a constant factor worse than the optimal welfare.
In these auctions, dashboards can also be used to infer agent values and the mapping from bids
to values can be used in place of the “quality score” that is already in use in these mechanisms.
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Dashboard-based mechanisms like the ones we construct could obtain more efficient outcomes in
these markets.
The approach of the main positive result of the paper is to link payments across successive stages
in the sequential mechanism. Linking otherwise independent decisions has proven to be useful in
overcoming difficulties in many areas of mechanism design. Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) show
that linking decisions in i.i.d. sequential bilateral exchange can bypass the Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) impossibility result. Gorokh et al. (2017) shows that good mechanisms without money can
be designed in a sequential environment by endowing agents with an artificial currency and run-
ning the sequential truthful mechanism with money. The endowment of artificial currency effec-
tively links decisions across stages. Armstrong (1999) shows that selling independent items in a
bundle can raise higher revenue than selling separately, cf. Babaioff et al. (2014). The linking de-
cisions idea is also in play in the previously discussed work on Bayes-Nash mechanism design by
Hartline and Taggart (2019).
The results of this paper can also be viewed as giving a blackbox reduction from truthful mecha-
nism design to algorithm design. For single-dimensinal agents, a Bayes-Nash reduction from mech-
anism design to non-monotone algorithm design was given by Hartline and Lucier (2010, 2015).
Multi-dimensional reductions for addressing non-monotonicity were studied by Hartline et al. (2015);
Bei and Huang (2011); and Dughmi et al. (2017). Blackbox reductions of revenue maximization
to welfare maximization were studied by Cai et al. (2013a,b). Single-call reductions, which reduce
truthful mechanism design to algorithm design with a single blackbox call to the monotone algo-
rithm were introduced by Babaioff et al. (2010) and further studied by Wilkens and Sivan (2015).
Our work extends this last area by giving single-call reductions to monotone algorithms for winner-
pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the multi-agent
and sequential environment for mechanism design. Section 3 reviews single-agent auction theory.
In particular, it shows that implementing winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms for a single
agent is straightforward. Section 4 gives the basic design of a dashboard mechanism. Section 5
gives a dashboard and proves that, in static environments, following the dashboard converges to
Nash equilibrium and this equilibrium implements the algorithm’s desired allocation. Section 6
defines our dynamic solution concept for dashboard mechanisms, namely approximate strategic
equivalence with the sequential truthful mechanism. In this section we describe a payment rebal-
ancing dashboard that guarantees this approximate strategic equivalence. Section 7 generalizes the
dashboards to environments where the mechanism only has access to the allocation algorithm by
single blackbox call. Finally, Section 8 shows that there is a natural all-pay dashboard for which
following the dashboard with a static value results in low outstanding balance, even in a dynamic
environment and without explicit rebalancing.
2 The Sequential Multi-agent Model
This paper considers general environments for single-dimensional linear agents. There are n agents
{1, . . . , n}. A profile of n agent values is denoted v = (v1, . . . , vn). A multi-agent allocation
algorithm is x : Rn → [0, 1]n. We assume that any constraints of the environment are satisfied
by the algorithm and will not otherwise be notating these constraints. A multi-agent non-truthful
mechanism is denoted (x˜, p˜) with bid allocation rule x˜ : Rn → [0, 1]n and p˜ : Rn → Rn. The
4
payment
v
x(v)
0
0
1 surplus
v
x(v)
0
0
1 utility
v
x(v)
0
0
1
Figure 1: The terms in the payment identity are depicted with p(0) = 0. The payment of the agent
is equal to surplus v x(v) minus the utility of the agent
∫
v
0 x(z) dz.
agents have linear utility, for example, the utility of agent i on bids b in (x˜, p˜) is vi x˜i(b)− p˜i(b).
We consider agents interacting sequentially in a mechanism over many stages. For stage s in
{1, . . . , t}, the environment is given by stage values v(s) and a stage allocation algorithm x(s). The
designer chooses a stage mechanism (x˜(s), p˜(s)) and the agents choose stage bids b(s). The designer
may choose the stage mechanism based on realized information and outcomes from previous stages.
We consider dynamic environments were the values and allocation algorithm can be distinct
across stages and static environments where the values and the allocation algorithm are the same
in every stage. In static environments both the designer may change the mechanism and the agents
may change their bids from stage to stage.
An allocation algorithm takes several forms which will be notated distinctly. The ex post
allocation algorithm is x : Rn → [0, 1]n. The ex post allocation for agent i is xi : R
n → [0, 1].
Denote the profile with agent i’s value replaced with z is (z, v−i) = (v1, . . . , vi−1, z, vi+1, . . . , vn).
Fixing the other agent values v−i, the projection of the ex post allocation algorithm is single-
agent allocation rule xi(z) = xi(z, v−i). An allocation which could be output from x is x; agent
i’s allocation is xi. Similar notation is adopted for other quantities that pertain to agents. For
example the single-agent strategy function that maps agent i’s value to a bid is denoted by bi while
a bid is denoted by bi.
3 Single-Agent Implementation
The multi-agent dashboard mechanisms of this paper will be based on a straightforward con-
struction of winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms for a single agent. The agent has a single-
dimensional value v and linear utility u = v x−p for allocation probability x and expected payment
p. Given a stochastic allocation algorithm x : R → [0, 1], which specifies a desired mapping from
the agent’s value to an allocation, we wish to implement x when the agent behaves strategically in
a mechanism with a winner-pays-bid or all-pay payment format.
A single-agent mechanism (x˜, p˜) maps a bid b to an allocation probability x˜(b) and payment
p˜(b). Winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms specify a bid allocation rule x˜ with bid payment
rule p˜, respectively, defined as
p˜(b) = b x˜(b), p˜(b) = b. (1)
Strategic behavior of an agent in such a mechanism is governed by the n = 1 agent special
case of the characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium of Myerson (1981). See Figure 1 for an
illustration of the geometry of the payment identity.
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Theorem 1 (A special case of Myerson, 1981). Bidding strategy b : R → R is a best response
for mechanism (x˜, p˜) if and only if its induced allocation and payment rules x(·) = x˜(b(·)) and
p(·) = x˜(b(·)) satisfy:
(a) monotonicity: x(·) is monotonically non-decreasing;
(b) payment identity:
p˜(v) = v x(v)−
∫
v
0
x(z) dz+ p(0); (2)
and, for any value of the agent, any bid not in the range of the bidding strategy is dominated by a
bid in the bidding strategy.
A simple concequence of Theorem 1 is that with a monotone allocation algorithm x the mech-
anism (x, p), with p given by the payment identity, is truthful, i.e., bidding b(v) = v is an optimal
stratgy for the agent. We will refer to (x, p) with p satisfying the payment identity as the truthful
implementation of x. Often in the literature the payment that the agent makes with value v = 0 is
p(0) = 0.
The payment identity of Theorem 1 also allows the winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms
that implement a monotone allocation algorithm x to be derived. In equations (3) and (4) these
derivations are given with winner-pays-bid on the left and all-pay on the right. Specifically, the
payment identity (2) and the formulae for payments from the payment format (1) give two equations
for payments from which the bid strategy can be derived:
b(v) = v−
1
x(v)
∫
v
0
x(z) dz+
p(0)
x(v)
, b(v) = v x(v)−
∫
v
0
x(z) dz+ p(0). (3)
When x is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable, b is as well and is, thus, invertible.
From this inversion b−1, the bid allocation rules that implement the allocation rule x are:
x˜(b) = x(b−1(b)), x˜(b) = x(b−1(b)). (4)
Note that the winner-pays-bid and all-pay strategies b from equation (3) as applied in equation (4)
are distinct.
The above discussion assumes that we are given x and which to construct a winner-pays-bid
or all-pay mechanism (x˜, p˜). In this case, inferring values from bids can be accomplished with the
inverse bidding strategy b−1 from equation (3). If instead we were given (x˜, p˜) we could invert
values from bids by evaluating the agent’s first order condition as follows. With value v the agent’s
optimal bid b in single-agent mechanism (x˜, p˜) satisfies v = p˜′(b)/x˜′(b). Evaluating this formula
with the winner-pays-bid and all-pay payment formats of equation (1), respectively, we have:
v = b+ x˜(b)/x˜′(b), v = 1/x˜′(b). (5)
The dashboard mechanisms designed in the remainder of the paper effectively convert the
mechanism design problem of implementing a multi-agent allocation algorithm into a collection of
problems where the above single-agent derivations apply.
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4 Dashboard Mechanisms
This section defines a family of dashboard mechanisms that give a practical approach to bidding
and optimization in non-truthful Internet markets. The principal publishes a bidding dashboard
which informs the agents of the market conditions; the agents use this dashboard to optimize their
bids. We consider dashboards that give each agent estimates of the outcome of the mechanism for
any possible bid of the agent. These estimates can be constructed, for example, from historical bid
behavior of the agents in the mechanism.
Definition 1. For a single-agent incentive compatible mechanism (y, q), the single-agent dashboard
is y˜ : R → [0, 1] as given by equation (4). A multi-agent dashboard is a profile of single-agent bid-
allocation rules y˜ = (y˜1, . . . , y˜n) where y˜i(b) is the forecast probability that agent i wins with bid b.
We consider the implementation of an allocation algorithm with a monotone allocation rule
x : Rn → [0, 1]n by winner-pays-bid and all-pay dashboard mechanisms. The winner-pays-bid and
all-pay format dashboards are identical except with respect to equations (3)-(5) which respectively
define the value-to-bid optimal bidding function, the translation from (value) allocation rules to
bid allocation rules, and the bid-to-value inversion for a bid-allocation rule.
We consider two design questions: (a) what dashboard should the principal publish and (b)
what mechanism should the principal run. The goal is to pick a dashboard for which following
the dashboard is a good strategy and if agents follow the dashboard then the allocation algorithm
is implemented. In fact, if agents follow the dashboard, then the mechanism to implement the
allocation algorithm is straightforward.
Definition 2. The dashboard mechanism x˜ : Rn → [0, 1]n for dashboard y˜ and allocation algorithm
x is:
0. Solicit bids b for dashboard y˜.
1. Infer values vˆ from bids from equation (5).
2. Output allocation x˜(b) = x(vˆ) (with prices p˜(b) according to the payment format).
Notice that in the above definition the bid allocation rule x˜ is a mapping Rn → [0, 1]n from
bid profiles to allocation profiles while the dashboard y˜ is a profile of single-agent bid allocation
rules (R → [0, 1])n each of which maps a bid to an allocation probability. In other words, outcomes
according to the dashboard are calculated independently across the agents while outcomes according
to the mechanism depend on the reports of all agents together. (The notation distinguishes these
kinds of allocation rules by using distinct typeface.) The following proposition follows simply from
the correctness of equation (5).
Proposition 1. In the dashboard mechanism (Definition 2) for any given strictly monotone and
continuously differentiable dashboard and any allocation algorithm, if the agents follow the dashboard
then the allocation algorithm is implemented.
5 Static Environments: Inferred Values Dashboards
Our analysis of dashboards in this section is restricted to static settings where both the agents’
values and the allocation algorithm do not change from stage to stage. How should the principal
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construct the dashboard to ensure the sequential dashboard mechanism, if all agents follow the
dashboard, converges so that following the dashboard is a Nash equilibrium? For static environ-
ments, we will say that following the dashboard converges to Nash equilibrium if, assuming other
agents follow the dashboard, an agent’s best response in the stage game converges to following the
dashboard.
Our approach is motivated by the solution concept of fictitious play. In fictitious play agents
best respond to the empirical distribution of the actions in previous rounds. Fictitious play assumes
that the agents know the actions in past rounds. The principal could publish these actions; however,
a better approach is to just publish as a dashboard the aggregate bid allocation rules that result.
Our dashboard follows this approach except with respect to estimated values rather than actions.
Following such a dashboard is, in a sense, an improvement on fictitious play.
Definition 3. For stage t+ 1 ≥ 2, the inferred values dashboard is the profile of single-agent bid
allocation rules y˜(t+1) defined as follows:
1. The inferred valuation profile for stage s ∈ {1, . . . , t} is vˆ(s).
2. The profile of single-agent allocation rules for stage s ∈ {1, . . . , t} is x(s) with x
(s)
i (z) =
xi(z, vˆ
(s)
−i ) for each agent i.
3. The empirical profile of single-agent allocation rules at stage t+ 1 is y(t+1) with y
(t+1)
i (z) =
1
t
∑
s≤t x
(s)
i (z) for each agent i.
4. The inferred values dashboard is the profile of single-agent bid allocation rules y˜(t+1) that
correspond to profile y(t+1) via equation (4).
Definition 4. The k-lookback inferred values dashboard is the variant of the inferred values dash-
board that averages over the last min(k, t) stages. The last-stage inferred values dashboard chooses
k = 1.
The inferred values dashboard does not specify a dashboard for stage 1. For stage 1, any
strictly increasing dashboard will suffice. When the agents’ values and the allocation rule are
static, following the dashboard converges to Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. In static environments with fixed values v and continuous and strictly monotone stage
allocation algorithm x, in the sequential dashboard mechanism with the k-lookback inferred values
dashboard, if agents follow the dashboard in stages max(t − k, 1) through t > 1 then following the
dashboard in stage t+ 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The dashboards up to and including round t are the average of the bid allocation rule for
a continuous and strictly increasing allocation algorithm; thus they are continuous and strictly
increasing. By equation (5) the inferred values of agents that follow the dashboard are the true
values. These values are the same in each stage; thus the profile of single-agent allocation rules in
each stage is the one that corresponds to the allocation algorithm on true valuation profile. The
average of these profiles of allocation rule is the profile itself (they are all the same). The dashboard
is the corresponding profile of single-agent bid allocation rules.
Consider agent i and assume that other agents are following the dashboard in stage t+1. Thus,
the estimated profile of other agent values is vˆ
(t+1)
−i = v−i. The allocation rule in value space faced
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by agent i is x
(t+1)
i (z) = xi(z, v−i) which is equal to the allocation rule in all the previous stages.
As the dashboard suggests bidding optimally according to the allocation rule of the previous stages,
bidding according to the dashboard is agent i’s best response. Thus, following the dashboard is a
Nash equilibrium in stage t+ 1.
This dashboard mechanism is simple and practical and can implement any strictly mono-
tone and continuously differentiable allocation algorithm. For example, welfare maximization
with a convex regularizer gives such a allocation algorithm. For the paradigmatic problem of
single-minded combinatorial auction environments, our dashboard mechanism with the regularized
welfare-maximization allocation algorithm gives outcomes that can be arbitrarily close to optimal
(for the appropriate regularizer).
A critical issue with the guarantee of Theorem 2 is that it is delicate to the Nash assumption.
If other agents do not follow the dashboard, then following the dashboard is not necessarily a good
strategy for the agent. The remainder of the paper will resolve this issue by giving stronger analyses
and stronger dashboards. Specifically, we will give a dashboard for which the sequential dashboard
mechanism is strategically equivalent to the sequential truthful mechanism.
6 Dynamic Environments: Payment Rebalancing Dashboards
In this section we develop a dashboard that will satisfy the strong guarantee that the ǫ equilibria of
the sequential dashboard mechanism are approximately the same as the ǫ equilibria from running the
truthful mechanism that implements the allocation algorithm in each stage. Moreover, the follow-
the-dashboard strategy corresponds to the truthtelling strategy and, thus, is an ǫ-equilibrium.5
Definition 5. Two sequential mechanisms are ǫ approximately strategically equivalent if for all
sequences of actions profiles in one mechanism there is a corresponding sequence of action profiles
in the other mechanism such that the absolute per-stage-average difference in utilities of any agent
in the two mechanisms is at most ǫ, and vice versa.
Definition 6. For a sequence of stage allocation algorithms x(1), . . . ,x(t), the sequential truthful
mechanism is given by the stage mechanism (x(s),p(s)) for stage s ∈ {1, . . . , t} where p
(s)
i (v) is
defined from the payment identity applied to xi(·, v−i) for each agent i.
Definition 7. A sequential dashboard mechanism is ǫ incentive consistent if it is ǫ strategically
equivalent to the sequential truthful mechanism and the follow-the-dashboard strategy corresponds
to the truthtelling strategy.
We now develop a dashboard for which the sequential dashboard mechanism is ǫ incentive
consistent with ǫ that vanishes with the number of stages. The high-level approach of this dashboard
is simple: In any stage where the actual payment and the truthful payment are different, add the
payment residual to a balance and adjust future dashboards to either collect additional payment or
to discount the required payment so that the outstanding balance is resolved over a few subsequent
stages. The difference in utilities of an agent in such a dashboard mechanism and the truthful
mechanism with the same allocation algorithm is bounded by the per-stage payment residual and
the number of stages it takes to resolve it. When these quantities are both constants, the average
5Note that the sequential truthful mechanism will generally have many other equilibria as well.
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per-stage difference between the dashboard mechanism’s outcome and the truthful mechanism’s
outcome vanishes with the number of stages.
The existence of this dashboard shows that in a repeated scenario there is essentially no dif-
ference between winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In some sense, linking
payments between stages and adjusting the mapping from bids to values allows a mechanism de-
signer to choose a payment format that is appropriate for the application.
Three final comments before presenting the mechanism: First, balancing payments in all-pay
mechanisms is much easier than balancing payments in winner-pays-bids mechanisms. The reason
is simple, in all-pay mechanisms the payment is deterministic and, thus, any additional payment
requested is paid exactly. On the other hand, payments collected in winner-pays-bid mechanisms
depend on the probability of allocation. If this probability of allocation is fluctuating then collected
payments can over- or under-shoot a target. We give an approach below that resolves this issue.
Second, in the static setting where the agent values and the allocation algorithm are unchanging,
in the follow-the-dashboard equilibrium of the inferred values dashboard mechanism (Definition 3)
the only non-trivial payment residual is in the first stage, once this balance is resolved, the accrual
of subsequent balance is off the equilibrium path. Thus, in steady state the rebalancing required by
the dashboard is trivial. Third, dashboards with payment rebalancing allow dynamically changing
environments, e.g., agent values and the allocation algorithm. For agents that follow the dashboard,
the rebalancing mechanism only kicks in when the environment changes.
The main definition and proposition that motivate the approach are as follows.
Definition 8. Define the outstanding balance of an agent in a t-stage sequential dashboard mech-
anism for inferred values vˆ(1), . . . , vˆ(t) as the magnitude of the total expected difference in payments
between the sequential dashboard mechanism and the sequential truthful mechanism when agents
report values vˆ(1), . . . , vˆ(t).
Proposition 2. A t-stage dashboard mechanism with worst-case (over valuation profiles) outstand-
ing balance upper bounded by ǫt is ǫ incentive consistent.
Proof. Fix t valuation profiles vˆ(1), . . . , vˆ(t) and consider the allocation and payments from the
sequential dashboard mechanism where agents follow the dashboard for these valuation profiles
and the sequential truthful mechanism where agents report these valuation profiles. The allocations
obtained by these two mechanisms are identical as both call the stage s allocation algorithm x(s)
on valuation profile vˆ(s). By the assumption of the proposition, the outstanding balance of any
agent, i.e., the total difference in payments of the mechanisms, is upper bounded by ǫt. For any
true valuation profiles, v(1), . . . , v(t), and because the utilities of the agent are linear in payments;
the per-stage-average difference in utility between the two mechanisms is at most ǫ. Thus, the
definition of ǫ incentive consistency is satisfied.
6.1 Rebalancing Dashboards
In the subsequent developments we will focus on a single agent. The rebalancing method will
construct a new dashboard y˜† from the single-agent truthful mechanism (y, q) where payment rule
q corresponds to allocation rule y via the payment identity (2). If the allocation algorithm for this
agent is x = y then the dashboard is correct and the correct payments are made; otherwise, the
dashboard is incorrect and the incorrect payments will need to be resolved by future dashboards.
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The main idea in the proposed rebalancing approach is that adding a constant to the agent’s
expected payment, i.e., setting q(0) 6= 0 in the payment identity, does not affect incentives. While
this approach could occasionally violate per-stage individual rationality, an agent’s long term utility
is optimized by continuing to participate even in these stages. Moreover, though we omit the details,
it would be straightforward to adjust the dashboard to not violate per-stage individual rationality
for values that are not too small.
Definition 9. For a single-agent truthful mechanism (y, q), the single-agent rebalancing dashboard
for rebalancing rate η ∈ (0, 1] and outstanding balance L is y˜† that corresponds to payment rule q†
defined as q†(v) = q(v) + L η, i.e., with q†(0) = L η.
From Definition 9 and equation (3), the bidding strategy can be calculated for winner-pays-bid
and all-pay dashboards, respectively
b†(v) = b(v) + L η/y(v), b†(v) = b(v) + L η. (6)
The bid-allocation rule of the dashboard y˜† is then defined via the allocation rule y and the inverse
of the strategy b† via equation (4). The bid of an agent should be viewed as shown in equation (6)
as two terms. The first term is for the original dashboard y and the second term is for resolving
the outstanding balance. After each stage the balance is adjusted to account for how much of the
outstanding balance was resolved and by any new payment residual resulting from misestimation
of the dashboard y for the realized allocation rule x. While our analysis will keep track of when
payment residuals are generated and how long it takes to resolve them, the balance tracking need
only consider the difference between what was paid and what should have been paid for the realized
allocation rule.
Definition 10. For a single-agent truthful mechanism (x, p), dashboard allocation rule y, and in-
ferred value vˆ, the payment residual for the payment rebalancing dashboard x˜† with realized allocation
rule x is
d(vˆ) = [p(vˆ)/x(vˆ)− b(vˆ)]x(vˆ), d(vˆ) = p(vˆ)− b(vˆ) (7)
in winner-pays-bid and all-pay formats, respectively. The balance resolved is
l(vˆ) = [L η/y(vˆ)]x(vˆ), l(vˆ) = L η, (8)
respectively. The total change to the balance is d(vˆ)− l(vˆ).
Note that in the above definition for winner-pays-bid mechanisms, if x = y then p(vˆ) = b(vˆ) y(vˆ)
and d(vˆ) = 0. For all-pay mechanisms with x = y, then p = β and d(vˆ) = 0. The perspective
to have is that in steady-state it should be that x = y and there should be no payment residual
but, when agents arrive, depart, or have value changes, then there can be non-trivial payment
residual which will be rebalanced by the dashboard. More generally the following lemma bounds
the magnitude of the payment residual.
Lemma 1. In a stage in which the agent’s inferred value is vˆ, the magnitude of payment residual
|d(vˆ)| is at most vˆ.
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Proof. From equation (7), for all-pay mechanisms the payment residual is the difference in bids
in an individually rational mechanism. As bids for an agent with value vˆ are between 0 and vˆ,
the magnitude of their difference is at most vˆ. For winner-pays-bid p(vˆ)/x(vˆ) − b(vˆ) is again a
difference of bids and multiplying this difference by x(vˆ) ∈ [0, 1] preserves the bound of vˆ on its
magnitude.
The analysis in the sections below makes no assumption about whether the mechanism is in
steady-state. Both the allocation algorithm and the agents’ values may change from stage to stage.
The main idea of the analysis is to consider the payment residual d(s) in stage s and calculate how
much of it can remain after stage t when there is a guaranteed fraction of it is rebalanced as part
of l(s
′) for subsequent stages s′ ∈ {s + 1, . . . , t}. We give a worst case analysis that pessimistically
assumes that the payment residual in each stage is the same sign and equal to its maximum value,
i.e., the value of the agent. These bounds apply to the rebalancing dashboard constructed from
any original dashboard that may not have any relation to the realized allocation rule.
6.2 Oustanding Balance of the All-pay Rebalancing Dashboard
Definition 11. From stage s with outstanding balance L(s), agent bid b(s), inferred value vˆ(s),
realized allocation rule x(s), and corresponding payment rule p(s); the stage s+1 outstanding balance
in the all-pay rebalancing dashboard is:
L(s+1) = L(s) + p(s)(vˆ(s))− b(s).
The analysis of the rebalancing dashboard for all-pay mechanisms is trivial. To parallel the
subsequent presentation for winner-pays-bid mechanisms below, we write the formal lemma and
theorem.
Lemma 2. In the all-pay dashboard with rebalancing rate η ∈ (0, 1], in any stage the balance
resolved is l(vˆ) = L η; for η = 1 the full outstanding balance is resolved.
Proof. See equation (8).
Theorem 3. In dynamic environments, the sequential dashboard mechanism with an all-pay re-
balancing dashboard with rebalancing rate η = 1 and per-stage estimated value at most v¯; the out-
standing balance at stage t is at most v¯ and, consequently, over t stages the dashboard mechanism
is v¯/t incentive consistent.
Proof. Lemma 1 upper bounds the payment residual of each stage by v¯ (which is added to the
outstanding balance). Lemma 2 upper bounds the outstanding balance prior to stage s that is
resolved in stage s. With η = 1 the outstanding balance at stage t is only the payment residual
from stage t. Thus, the outstanding balance after stage t is upper bounded by v¯. Applying
Proposition 2 the sequential dashboard mechanism is v¯/t incentive consistent.
Note that Theorem 3 can be improved in static environments where both inferred stage values
vˆ(s) and the single-agent allocation rules induced from the values of the other agents x(s) are static,
i.e., vˆ(s) = vˆ and x(s) = x. In these cases the inferred values dashboard (Definition 3) is y(s) = x in
all stages but the first and only this first stage accrues payment residual. Thus, the total balance
at stage t ≥ 2 with η = 1 is L(t) = 0.
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6.3 Oustanding Balance of the Winner-pays-bid Rebalancing Dashboard
Defining good rebalancing dashboards is more challenging for winner-pays-bid dashboards as the
balance resolved depends on the dashboard at the estimated value y(vˆ) which we do not require
to be constant across rounds. We therefore chose a conservative rebalancing rate η < 1 to avoid
overshooting the target of zero balance. Specifically, we will set η less than the minimum allocation
probability of the dashboard; thus η/y(vˆ) ≤ 1 in equation (8). As the rebalancing dashboard can fix
any incorrect dashboard, it may be desirable to distort the dashboard at the low end to guarantee
that that the minimum allocation probability of the dashboard is not too small.
Since we are considering winner-pays-bid mechanisms we will only adjust an agent’s balance
when the agent is allocated. To make explicit the actual values versus their expectations we will
adopt notation Lˇ and xˇ for the actual balance and actual allocation with L = E
[
Lˇ
]
and x(vˆ) = E[xˇ].
We rewrite, per the discussion above, the payment residual and balanced resolved from equations
(7) and (8) for inferred value vˆ as:
dˇ = [p(vˆ)/x(vˆ)− b(vˆ)] xˇ, lˇ = [L η/y(vˆ)] xˇ (9)
where E
[
dˇ
]
= d(vˆ) and E
[
lˇ
]
= l(vˆ). Note that p(vˆ)/x(vˆ) is the winner-pays-bid bid strategy
corresponding to x while b is the winner-pays-bid bid strategy for dashboard y.
Definition 12. From stage s with outstanding balance L(s), agent bid b(s), inferred value vˆ(s),
realized allocation rule x(s), corresponding payment rule p(s), and realized allocation xˇ(s); the stage
s+ 1 outstanding balance in the all-pay rebalancing dashboard is:
Lˇ(s+1) = Lˇ(s) + [p(s)(vˆ(s))/x(s)(vˆ(s))− b(s)] xˇ(s).
Denote by Tˇ = {s : xˇ(s) 6= 0} the set of stages where the agent is allocated and by τˇ =
∣∣Tˇ ∣∣ the
number of such stages. These are the stages where dˇ(s) and lˇ(s) can be non-zero. We consider the
amount of the payment residual dˇ(s) from stage s ∈ Tˇ that remains at final stage t when at each
subsequent stage in Tˇ a fraction of that payment residual is resolved.
Lemma 3. At any rebalancing stage s ∈ Tˇ and under any agent strategy, the winner-pays-bid re-
balancing dashboard with rebalancing rate η ∈ (0, 1) for dashboard allocation rule y(s) with allocation
probability supported on [η, 1] resolves balance lˇ between Lˇ η and Lˇ.
Proof. This result follows from the definition of lˇ and the fact that η ≤ η/y(vˆ) ≤ 1 for all vˆ by the
assumption that 1 ≥ y(vˆ) ≥ η.
The following theorem about the winner-pays-bid dashboard rebalancing mechanism will upper
bound the outstanding balance at any time. With these quantities taken as constants relative
to the number of stages t, the imbalance per stage is vanishing with t. It is useful to contrast
the assumptions and bounds of the analogous result for all-pay dashboards (Theorem 3) with
Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. For any monotonic stage allocation rules x(1), . . . , x(t) and any monotonic dashboard
rules y(1), . . . , y(t) with probabilities supported on [η, 1], the winner-pays-bid payment rebalancing
dashboard with rebalancing rate η and per-stage payment residual at most d¯ has outstanding balance
at stage t of at most d¯/η.
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Proof. If we start a stage s with outstanding balance Lˇ(s), Lemma 3 implies that at least a η (and
at most 1) fraction of it is resolved. The balance remaining is at most (1 − η) Lˇ(s) (and at least
zero).
Denote the stages that the agent is allocated, indexed in decreasing order, by Tˇ = {s0, . . . , sτˇ−1}.
The payment residual dˇ(sk) from stage sk that remains in the final stage t is at most (1 − η)
k dˇ.
(This bound is worst case, specifically, we do not track the possibility that some of the balance
might cancel with new payment residual of the opposite sign.) We can bound the outstanding
balance at stage t by:
L(t) ≤ d¯
∑τˇ−1
k=0
(1− η)k
≤ d¯
∑∞
k=0
(1− η)k
= d¯/η.
With an upperbound on the per-stage estimated value of v¯, Theorem 4 can be combined with
Lemma 1, which bounds d¯ ≤ v¯, to obtain the following corollary. The sequential dashboard mech-
anism with a rebalancing dashboard is ǫ incentive consistent with ǫ ≤ v¯/(η t) in t rounds (see
Definition 7 and Proposition 2). With v¯/η held as constants the incentive inconsistency vanishes
with t.
Corollary 1. In dynamic environments, the sequential dashboard mechanism with a winner-pays-
bid rebalancing dashboard with rebalancing rate η ∈ (0, 1), dashboard allocation probabilities sup-
ported on [η, 1], and per-stage estimated value at most v¯; the outstanding balance at stage t is at
most v¯/η and, consequently, over t stages the dashboard mechanism is v¯/(η t) incentive consistent.
Note that Theorem 4 can be improved in static environments where both inferred stage values
vˆ(s) and the single-agent allocation rules induced from the values of the other agents x(s) are static,
i.e., vˆ(s) = vˆ and x(s) = x. In these cases the inferred values dashboard (Definition 3) is y(s) = x in
all stages but the first and only this stage accrues non-trivial payment residual. In this case, the
total balance at stage t is L(t) ≤ vˆ (1− η)τˇ−1, i.e., exponentially small in the number of stages that
the agent is allocated.
6.4 Practical Considerations
In practical implementations of the rebalancing dashboard, it may be undesirable for the dashboard
to fluctuate significantly from stage to stage as positive and negative balances are resolved. One
approach to provide a dashboard that varies less across successive stages is to allow the magnitude
outstanding balance to be a small positive multiple of vˆ and only resolve the outstanding balance
when this allowed magnitude is exceeded. We omit further details or analysis.
7 Single-call Dashboards
In this section we generalize the construction of dashboards and their analyses to the practically
realistic case that the principal has only single-call access to the allocation algorithm. For exam-
ple, given a profile of values, the principal can draw a single sample from the distribution of the
algorithm’s outcomes. Such a dashboard is necessary for online marketplaces where the allocations
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of the algorithm are endogenous to the behavior of one side of the market. E.g., in ad auctions
where the mechanism is designed for the advertisers and the users show up and make decisions that
realize the stochasticity of the allocation. The single-call perspective of this section allows viewing
the allocation algorithm as a map from the values of the agents to how agents are prioritized in
the marketplace where stochastic outcomes are obtained.
The single-call model of mechanism design is one where the designer has an algorithm and
aims to design a mechanism that implements the allocation of the algorithm in equilibrium. The
designer, however, can only call the algorithm once. The single-call model is significant in that the
standard methods for calculating payments in mechanisms, e.g., in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or
unbiased payment mechanism (Archer and Tardos, 2001), require n+1 blackbox calls to the algo-
rithm. Babaioff et al. (2010) showed that truthful single-call mechanisms exist. These mechanisms
randomly perturb the allocation algorithm and use these perturbations to compute the correct
payments for the perturbed allocation algorithm.
There are two challenges to single-call implementation of dashboards. First, for the valuation
profile input into the algorithm, only the realized allocation in xˇ ∈ {0, 1}n is observed. The
allocation probabilities are not observed. Second, the principal does not have counterfactual access
to the allocation algorithm that we have previously used to determine reasonable dashboards.
Recall, a dashboard is a prediction of the bid allocation rule faced by a agent. This prediction
requires knowledge, e.g., for agent i of xi(z, v−i) for all z.
Both of these challenges are solved by instrumenting the allocation algorithm. Specifically, we
instrument the allocation algorithm with uniform exploration, i.e., with probably ρ independently
for each agent we enter a uniform random value rather than the agent’s value. This instrumentation
degrades the quality of the allocation algorithm by ρ. First, this uniform instrumentation can be
viewed as a randomized controlled experiment for estimating the counterfactual allocation rule
as is necessary for giving the agent a dashboard that estimates her bid-allocation rule. Second,
the uniform exploration enables implicitly calculating unbiased truthful payments for the realized
mechanism (cf. Babaioff et al., 2010). The difference between these desired payments and the actual
payments, i.e., the agent’s bid if she wins, can then be added to the outstanding balance in the
payment rebalancing dashboard of Section 6.
Definition 13. The instrumented allocation algorithm w for allocation algorithm x, instrumen-
tation rate ρ ∈ (0, 1), valuation range [0, v¯], and input valuation profile v is:
1. For each agent i, sample
vˇi ∼
{
vi with probability 1− ρ,
U [0, v¯] with probability ρ.
2. Define w(v) = Evˇ[x(vˇ)] and sample wˇ ∼ w(v), i.e., run x on vˇ.
3. For each agent i, set instrumentation variables
xˇi = wˇi 1[vˇi = vi], πˇi = wˇi
v¯
vi
1[vˇi < vi], rˇi = vi
(
xˇi −
1−ρ
ρ
πˇi
)
.
The truthful payment functions for w are denoted by r, via the payment identity (2).
Theorem 5. The instrumentation payment variables rˇ are unbiased estimators for the incentive
compatible payments r(v) for the instrumented allocation algorithm w, i.e., E[rˇ] = r(v).
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Proof. We break the payment ri(v) for agent i into two parts, the part where vˇi = vi and the part
where vˇi 6= vi. In the latter part the payment identity requires zero payment. In the former, which
happens with probability 1 − ρ, the payment conditioned on vˇ−i is pi(vi, vˇ−i) = vixi(vi, vˇ−i) −∫
vi
0 xi(z, vˇ−i) dz. The expected payment conditioned on vˇ−i (but not conditioning on vˇi = vi) is
(1− ρ)pi(vi, vˇ−i).
Now evaluate E[ˇri | vˇ−i] as defined in Definition 13 as follows:
E[ˇri | vˇ−i] = viE[xˇi | vˇ−i]− vi
1−ρ
ρ
E[πˇi | vˇ−i]
= vi (1− ρ)xi(vi, vˇ−i)− vi
1−ρ
ρ
ρ
v¯
v¯
vi
∫
vi
0
xi(z, vˇ−i) dz
= (1− ρ)pi(vi, vˇ−i).
Since the expected payments conditioned on vˇ−i are equal, so are the unconditional expected
payments.
Instrumentation allows the mechanism to construct a consistent estimator for the realized allo-
cation rule that is otherwise unknown. This estimator can be used to construct a dashboard.
Definition 14. For stage t ≥ t0, the instrumented dashboard is the profile of single-agent bid
allocation rules y˜(t) defined by y˜
(t)
i for agent i as follows:
0. Let vˆ
(s)
i denote the agent’s inferred value in stage s ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}.
1. Define allocation data set corresponding to the uniform instrumentation {(vˇ
(s)
i , wˇ
(s)
i ) : s ∈
{1, . . . , t− 1} ∧ vˇi 6= vˆ
(s)
i }.
2. Define the empirical average allocation as µˆ
(t)
i as the average allocation of this data set.
3. Define the empirical allocation rule as xˆ
(t)
i : R → [0, 1] as a continuous isotonic regression of
the allocation data set.
4. Define the instrumented allocation rule as y
(t)
i = (1− ρ) xˆ
(t)
i (v) + ρ µˆ
(t)
i .
5. The instrumented dashboard for agent i is the bid-allocation rule y˜
(t)
i that corresponds to y
(t)
i
via equation (4).
Standard methods for isotonic regression can be used to estimate the empirical allocation rule
in Definition 14. Errors in the regression will be resolved by the rebalancing approach of Section 6.
A key required property, however, is that dashboard is continuous. Thus, isotonic regressions that
result in continuous functions should be preferred. Approaches to isotonic regression in statistics,
including smoothing and penalization (see Ramsay, 1988, Mammen, 1991, Kakade et al., 2011)
guarantee continuity of the resulting estimator for the regression function. The ironing procedure
common in Bayesian mechanism design is an isotonic regression; however, it results in discontinuous
functions and is, thus, inappropriate for constructing dashboards.
The analysis below focuses on the winner-pays-bid rebalancing instrumented dashboard for the
instrumented allocation algorithm. (Recall that all-pay mechanisms have deterministic payments
and, thus, the budget imbalance generated at a given round can be resolved deterministically. We
omit the simple analysis.) With winner-pays-bid mechanisms the payments are only made when
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the agent is allocated. As a result, the payment residual and balanced resolved are stochastic and
necessitate a more sophisticated analysis.
The rebalancing approach in Section 6 used the functional form of the allocation algorithm
to calculate the difference between actual payments given by the payment format and incentive
compatible payments given by the payment identity. This payment residual is added to a balance
and each stage a portion of the balance is added to the payment of a type with zero value when
determining the dashboard. Our approach here is to instead use the implicit payments which, by
Theorem 5, are unbiased estimators of the incentive compatible payments. The three terms in the
balance update formula below are the previous balance, the implicit payment of the current stage,
and the actual payment of the current stage.
Definition 15. From stage s with outstanding balance Lˇ(s), agent bid b(s), realized instrumented
allocation wˇ(s), and realized implicit payment rˇ(s); the stage s+1 outstanding balance in the winner-
pays-bid instrumented rebalancing dashboard is:
Lˇ(s+1) = Lˇ(s) + rˇ(s) − wˇ(s) b(s).
We first confirm that in expectation the analysis of Section 6 holds. Recall from equation (6)
that the bid strategy for the payment rebalancing dashboard for allocation rule y is b†(v) = b(v) +
Lˇ η/y(v). Thus the actual payment in the balance update formula can be split for inferred value vˆ
satisfying b = b†(vˆ) giving a balance update as
rˇ − wˇ b = rˇ− wˇ b(vˆ)− wˇ Lˇ η/y(vˆ).
Define the payment residual (cf. Definition 10) as the first two terms and the resolved balance as
the last term:
dˇ = rˇ− wˇ b(vˆ), lˇ = wˇ Lˇ η/y(vˆ).
Thus, the total change to the cumulative balance is dˇ − lˇ. Importantly the expected payment
residual E
[
dˇ
]
matches Definition 10. Taking expectations and applying Theorem 5 we have,
E
[
dˇ
]
= r(vˆ)− w(vˆ) b(vˆ)
Here r is the payment rule for w and payment y(vˆ) b(vˆ) satisfies the payment identity for y. Thus,
if the dashboard is correct, i.e., y = w, then the expected payment residual E
[
dˇ
]
is zero. When we
have incorrect estimates, the extent to which the difference of the first terms is not zero is gives a
payment residual that must be rebalanced in the future.
Our analysis starts with three observations:
• When wˇ = 0 the payment residual and amount rebalanced are zero, i.e., dˇ = lˇ = 0; otherwise:
• the size of the range of dˇ is vˆ/ρ (equal to the size of the range of rˇ which equals vˆ [−(1−ρ)/ρ, 1]
for inferred value vˆ); and
• the amount rebalanced is Lˇη/y(vˆ) for inferred value vˆ.
Our analysis proceeds like that of Section 6. We consider the τˇ stages s where the agent is allocated,
i.e., Tˇ = {s : wˇ(s) 6= 0}. These are the stages where dˇ(s) and lˇ(s) can be non-zero. We consider
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the amount of the payment residual dˇ(s) from stage s ∈ Tˇ that remains at final stage t when, at
each subsequent stage in Tˇ , a fraction of that payment residual is resolved. Lemma 3 shows that
the balance resolved in each stage s ∈ Tˇ is between L(s) η and L(s). The magnitude of the payment
residual is upper bounded by vˆ/ρ in the lemma below.
Lemma 4. In a stage in which the agent’s inferred value is vˆ, the single-call winner-pays-bid
rebalancing dashboard for instrumented allocation algorithm with instrumentation probability ρ has
payment residual with magnitude |dˇ| at most vˆ/ρ.
Proof. When xˇ = 0 the payment residual is zero. The payment residual when xˇ = 1 is dˇ = rˇ− b(vˆ)
with rˇ = vˆ (xˇ − 1−ρ
ρ
πˇ). The magnitude |dˇ| ≤ 1−ρ
ρ
vˆ + b(vˆ). Since the winner-pays-bid strategy
(without the addition for rebalancing) is individually rational b(vˆ) ≤ vˆ and, thus, |dˇ| ≤ vˆ/ρ.
We are ready now to apply Theorem 4 to the rebalancing dashboard for the instrumented
allocation algorithm. A helpful property of the instrumented allocation algorithm (Definition 13)
is that the instrumentation implies that the allocation probabilities for all agents are bounded away
from zero, i.e., the minimum allocation probability for an agent i in the dashboard is ρ times the
average allocation probability for i with value vˇi ∼ U [0, v¯] in the induced allocation algorithm. We
need to set η to lower bound this quantity.
Corollary 2. For the single-call winner-pays-bid rebalancing dashboard for instrumented allocation
algorithm with rebalancing rate η (set appropriately), instrumentation parameter ρ, and values in
[0, v¯]; the outstanding balance at stage t is at most v¯/(ρ η).
Note that this bound is on the realized total balance and is not a high-probability or in-
expectation result; it holds always. The payment residual at any stage is a random variable with
expected magnitude at most v¯ and range at most v¯/ρ. The expected payment residual, however,
has magnitude at most v¯ (Lemma 1). Theorem 4 implies that the expected outstanding balance
at time t is at most v¯/η. Incentive consistency is defined in expectation over randomization in the
mechanism and strategies. We have the following corollary. As before, holding v¯/η constant, the
incentive inconsistency vanishes with t.
Corollary 3. For the single-call winner-pays-bid rebalancing dashboard for instrumented allocation
algorithm with rebalancing rate η (set appropriately), instrumentation parameter ρ, and values in
[0, v¯]; over t stages the dashboard mechanism is v¯/(η t) incentive inconsistent for all strategies.
The bound of Corollary 2 can be improved via the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality. We show that
the outstanding balance at time t is the weighted average of these payment residuals with weights
that are geometrically decreasing. This results in the following high-probability bound.
Theorem 6. For the single-call winner-pays-bid rebalancing dashboard for instrumented allocation
algorithm with rebalancing rate η (set appropriately), instrumentation parameter ρ, and values in
[0, v¯]; the outstanding balance at stage t is at most v¯/η+ v¯
ρ
√
1
2η log
(
2
δ
)
with probability at least 1−δ.
Proof. By Lemma 4 for each stage s, |dˇ(s)| ≤ v¯/ρ. At the same time E
[
dˇ(s)
]
≤ v¯ and dˇ(s) = 0
whenever wˇ(s) = 0. As in the proof of Theorem 4, consider the stages Tˇ = {s0, . . . , sτˇ−1} with
non-zero payments indexed in decreasing order. Then
Lˇ(t) −E
[
Lˇ(t)
]
=
τˇ∑
k=0
k−1∏
l=0
(
1− η/y
(sl)
i (vˆ
(sl))
)(
dˇ(sk) −E
[
dˇ(sk)
])
,
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where the range of each term in the sum is bounded by (1− η)k v¯/ρ.
Then we can apply the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality to evaluate
Pr
[∣∣∣Lˇ(t) −E[Lˇ(t)]∣∣∣ > ξ ∣∣∣ wˇ(1), . . . , wˇ(t)] ≤ 2 exp(− 2ξ2∑∞
l=0(1− η)
2lv¯2/ρ2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2ξ2ρ2η
v¯2
)
which follows from
(∑τˇ
l=0(1− η)
2l
)−1
≥
(∑∞
l=0(1− η)
2l
)−1
= 1 − (1 − η)2 ≥ η, since 0 < η < 1
and η ≥ η2.
Then with probability δ the imbalance of empirical dashboard with instrumentation can deviate
from the expectation no further than v¯
ρ
√
1
2η log
(
2
δ
)
.
8 Minimal Rebalancing
In this section we assume as in Section 5 and Section 6 that the functional form of the alloca-
tion algorithm is available. The rebalancing dashboard of Section 6 allowed the conversion of the
dashboard corresponding to any strictly monotone allocation rule into one where the outstanding
balance, i.e., the difference between payments in the sequential dashboard mechanism and sequen-
tial truthful mechanism, in any dynamic environment is bounded. On the other hand, following
the dashboard for the inferred values dashboard of Section 5 converges in two stages to Nash and
the subsequent payment residual is zero.
While rebalancing is helpful for identifying dashboard mechanisms with provably incentive prop-
erties in dynamic environments; dashboards should also have little or no rebalancing required in
static environments. Such a result is possible by using the rebalancing approach on the inferred
values dashboard of Section 5. In this section we further investigate the question of whether there
are dashboards that require very little explicit rebalancing.
The main result of this section is the observation that the all-pay last-stage inferred-values
dashboard (Definition 4) does not require any rebalancing for an agent with a static value, even
when the allocation algorithm or other agent values can be dynamic.
Lemma 5. For an agent with static per-stage value v, the outstanding balance of the all-pay last-
stage inferred-values dashboard mechanism at stage t is at most v.
Proof. We will consider grouping the allocation of stage s with the payment in stage s + 1 (with
the allocation of stage t paired with the payment of stage 1) and we will refer to this grouping as
outcome s. If the agent follows the dashboard, outcomes corresponding to s ∈ {1, . . . , t−1} are the
truthful outcomes for the allocation rule of stage s and value v. Specifically, the bid in stage s+ 1
is equal to the payment according to the dashboard in stage s+ 1 which is equal to the allocation
rule of stage s. Thus, the payment is stage s + 1 is the correct payment for the allocation rule in
stage s and static value v. The imbalance of payments from outcome t (the allocation from stage
t and payment from stage 1), by Lemma 1 in Section 6, is at most v.
As is evident by the proof of Lemma 5, the payment residual in each stage can be large, but
because of the relationship between the dashboard and allocation algorithm in successive stages the
overall outstanding balance remains small. When combining this dashboard with the rebalancing
approach, it is important not to attempt to resolve the payment residual immediately. For example,
allowing a small outstanding balance of, e.g., 2v¯, to persist will allows this naturally rebalancing
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dashboard to remain balanced. Of course, when the agent’s value changes, the payment residual
will need to be resolved by explicit rebalancing.
We leave as open questions whether there are natural winner-pays-bid dashboard that minimize
rebalancing for agents with static values.
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